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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-SUSPENDED
ANTEED NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY To BE HEARD
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STUDENTS GUAR-

Nine Columbus, Ohio, high school students were suspended1 for
up to 10 days without a hearing pursuant to an Ohio statute.2 These
students subsequently brought a class action against the Columbus
Board of Education and various administrators of the Columbus
Public School System seeking a declaration that the Ohio statute
was unconstitutional3 and also an injunction ordering school officials to remove all record of the suspensions from the students'
files. A three-judge district court 4 found that the Ohio statute violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and ordered
the suspensions expunged from the students' files. 5 On appeal, in
a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that students
faced with 10-day suspensions could not be deprived of their right
to an education without notice and opportunity to be heard. Goss
v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
Historically, the educational setting has been protected from constitutional challenges, that protection being predicated on one of
three theories. The first theory, loco parentis," applies in all educational settings-elementary, secondary and college-level public
schools, and private schools. Under this theory, a parent delegates

his authority over the child to the school, thus enabling instructors
and administrators to discipline students in whatever manner they
1. All nine students attended school within the Columbus, Ohio Public School System
and were suspended in conjunction with a generally disruptive atmosphere present during
February and March, 1971. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 733-34 (1975).
2. OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (1972) provides:
The superintendent of schools of a city or exempted village, the executive
head of a local school district, or the principal of a public school may suspend a pupil from school for not more than ten days. Such superintendent or
executive head may expel a pupil from school. Such superintendent, executive
bead, or principal shall within twenty-four hours after the time of expulsion
or suspension, notify the parent or guardian of the child, and the clerk of the
board of education in writing of such expulsion or suspension including the
reasons therefor. The pupil or the parent, or guardian, or custodian of a
pupil so expelled may appeal such action to the board of education at any
meeting of the board and shall be permitted to be heard against the expulsion. At the request of the pupil, or his parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney, the board may hold the hearing in executive session but may act upon
the expulsion only at a public meeting. The board may, by a majority vote of
its full membership, reinstate such pupil. No pupil shall be suspended or expelled from any school beyond the current semester.
3. The asserted unconstitutionality was based on two grounds: 1) suspension without
due process safeguards of notice and prior hearing violates the fourteenth amendment oecause it denies students an education, a public right, without due process of law; 2) the
statute and accompanying regulations were vague and overbroad. Lopez v. Williams, 372
F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd sub nom. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
4. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd sub noa. Goss V.
Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
5. The district court found no merit in the vagueness and overbreadth argument. Id. at
i303. The students have not appealed this part of the court's decision. Goss v. Lopez, 95
S. Ct. 733 n.3 (1975).
6. One who stands in loco parentis stands in the place of the parent. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 986 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
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deem necessary.7 A second theory, maintained primarily in -private
schools and universities, is based on contract." Under this theory, students often submit to waiver clauses contained in school bulletins and
registration blanks, thereby surrendering some, if not all, of their constitutional rights.2 The last theory advanced as rationale for minimal
court intervention is that education is a revocable privilege that
'a student enjoys, rather than an absolute right that he or she may
demand. 0
In 1957 Professor Seavey wrote a blistering response to the present courts' policy of nonintervention.1 1 Likening the school-student
relationship to a fiduciary relationship 1 2 he stated that the school3
is under a duty to fully explain the nature of any waiver clauses
and to disclose all charges and accompanying evidence against the
student pending dismissal.14 He further opined that:
[I]t is shocking that the officials of a state educational
institution, which can function properly only if our freedoms
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 152 (1965): "One who is charged only with
the education or some other part of the training of a child has the privilege of using
force or confinement to discipline the child only in so far as the privilege is necessary
for the education or other part of the training which is committed or delegated to the
actor." This disciplinary privilege is limited in the private school setting to only as much
of the parent's privilege as the parent chooses to delegate. No such limitation is placed
upon the university or public school. Id. § 153.
8. The school allows a student to continue his studies and receive a degree in return
for the student's reliance in money and time, conditioned upon the student's compliance
With reasonable regulations. Note, Private Government on the Cainpus-Judicial Review
of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1369 n.30 (1963).
9. Id. at 1869. The following language as printed In college catalogs and on registration cards was held valid and binding upon the student:
Attendance at the University Is a privilege and not a right. In order to safeguard those ideals of scholarship and that moral atmosphere which are in
the very purpose of its founding and maintenance, the University reserves
the right and the student concedes to the University the right to require the
withdrawal of any student at any time for any reason deemed sufficient to
it, and no reason for requiring such withdrawal need be given. Anthony v.
Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 489, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435, 438 (1928).
10. Board of Trustees v. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 633-34, 62 So. 827, 830-31 (1913) aff'd,
237 U.S. 589 (1915).
11. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process", 70 HARV. L. Rgv. 1406 (1957).
12. Id. at 1407 n.3.
A fiduciary Is one whose function it is to act for the benefit of another as to
matters relevant to the relation between them. Since schools exist pimarily
for the education of their students, It is obvious that professors and administrators act in a fiduciary capacity with reference to the students. One of the
duties of the fiduciary is to make full disclosure of all relevant facts in any
transaction between them. See RESTATEMENT, AOENCY § 390 (1933) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 170 (1935). The dismissal of a student comes within this
rule. Id. n.3.
13. Criticizing the validity of the waiver clause upheld in Anthony v. Syracuse Univ.,
224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928), Seavey stated: "Bearing in mind that a
university and its instructors are subject to fiduciary duties in dealing with their students, a university should at least be under a duty to explain to the student the sweeping
nature of his waiver." Seavey, supra note 11, at 1409.
14. Seavey also criticized the dictum In Vermillion v. State ex rel Engelhardt, 78 Neb
107, 112-13, 110 N.W.736, 738 (1907) by stating:
The school committee could suspend a public-school student without a hearing, (and] the student could obtain mandamus ordering his reinstatement
by proving that the action of the school was arbitrary, an impossible task
without knowledge of the evidence against him.
Seavey, supra note 11, at 1408 (footnotes omitted).
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are preserved, should not understand the elementary principles of fair play. It is equally shocking to find that a court
supports them in denying to a student the protection given to
a pickpocket. 5
Prior to Goss, the Supreme Court had not formulated indentifiable standards for dealing with educational institutions. While remaining relatively inactive regarding the due process clause, 16 it
occasionally acted to protect free speech. 7
Recognizing the importance of education, 8 the Court has tried
to maintain a balance between student rights and school authority.
This resulted in a tipping of the scales in 1968 when the Court
stated, "Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which
do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values."' 19
The final pre-Goss statement concerning education came in San Antonio Independent School District vs. Rodriguez2° where the court
explained that education per se was not a constitutionally protected
21
right..
While the Supreme Court remained inactive, the lower federal
22
courts took the front. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education
in 1961 was the first decision to hold that due process guarantees
must be afforded to the student faced with expulsion. 23 This decision opened the floodgates; during the late sixties and early seventies, students rushed to the courts. Within that pe-riod, the courts
24
universally granted procedural protection in the case of expulsion,'
but remained well-divided concerning lesser penalties, particularly
suspensions of 10 days or less. 25 The Fifth Circuit was blessed
with the bulk of the load; highly exemplary of the nationwide trend,
15. Seavey, supra note 11, at 1407.
16. Early cases asserted a conditional, rather than an absolute, right to attend a university. Waugh v. 1d. of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589 (1915)
(a university regulation banning
fraternities and their members from campus was held valid) ; Hamilton v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (student's right to attend university conditioned upon
attendance at military classes).
17. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (free. speech infringed
when Jehovah's Witnesses were required to salute American flag) ; Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing armbands is type of symbolic act within free speech clause of first amendment), he The court in Tinker stated, "It
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506.
18. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) where the court stated: "Today,
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. . . . In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life It
he Is denied the opportunity of an education." Id. at 493.
19. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
20. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
21. Id. at 35.
22. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) (Black students were expelled for sit-in participation).
23. Id. at 158-59. Dixon required: 1) notice of the charges; 2) fair hearing before expulsion (nature of hearing varying with the circumstances) ; 3) right to be heard in
one's own defense. Id.
244. 95 S. Ct. at 737 n.8.
25. Id. at 737-38 n.8.
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it, too, wavered from one position to the other when faced with
short-term suspensions. 26 No logical line could be drawn; courts
consistently differed as to what point on the suspension-expulsion
scale that a deprivation of education became trivial. 27
While the lower courts explored the advantages and disadvantages of judicial interposition of due process guarantees, rarely did
these courts explore the actual basis for that clause's application.
One might sum up the state of the law approaching Goss by quoting Charles Allan Wright,
Although the underlying assumption of these opinions is that
the student's important interests should not be arbitrarily
denied by the state, the cases are less than lucid in reconciling the application of due process clause with the actual
words of the amendment. 2
Almost as if it was directly responding to Wright's criticism,
the majority in Goss specificially applied due process clause language to the facts of the case. First, considering whether education
may be termed a property interest, the Court pointed out that
protected property interests are normally not created by the Constitution. " 'Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined'
by an independent source such as state statutes or rules entitling
the citizen to certain benefits. ' 29 These property interests might
otherwise be termed government largess; 0 those of most recent
26. Compare Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973) (indefinite suspensions), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1032 (1973) ; Black Students of North Fort Myers
Jr.-Sr. High School v. Williams, 470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972) (10-day suspension); Pervis v. LaMargue Indep. School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1972) (long suspensions);
Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 967 n.4 (5th Cir. 1972) (three-day
suspension) ; Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971) (the addition of a 30-day suspension to a 10-day suspension where the Fifth Circuit held the due
process clause applicable) with Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d
1040 (9th Cir. 1973) (all suspensions no matter how short) ; Murray v. West Baton Rouge
Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973) (suspensions of not more than a few
days) ; Dunn v. Tyler Indep. School Dist., 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972) (three-day suspension) where the Fifth Circuit held the due process clause inapplicable.
27. See, e.g., Farrel v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2nd Cir. 1971). The court stated: "Expulsion would be at one extreme. Near the end of the other might be a penalty of
staying after school for one hour for 'unexcused tardiness to class or study hall' . . . . Of
course, as one approaches the center of the two extremes of major and minor discipline,
the line becomes shadowy, but the difficulty of drawing it does not eliminate the distinction between the two." Id. at 162.
28. Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 -ARV. L. REv. 1045, 1135
(1968).
29. 95 S. Ct. at 735. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) first articulated
this dimension theory. It further explained that to have a property interest in a benefit,
one must have more than an abstract need or desire for it and more than a unilateral expectation of it. "He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. at 577.
30. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Reich states three thresgi-.A
questions: 1) when may the government revoke these governmentally-created interests;
2) when may the individual claim the entitlement as a matter of right; 3) what procedural protection must be afforded the individual before the benefit may be revoked
Id. at 789.
Disagreeing with total government control over governmentally-created benefits,
Reich further states: "Eventually those forms of largess which are closely linked to status
must be deemed to be held as of right. Like property, such largess could be governed by a
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vintage are statutory entitlements. 3'
In Goss education was given a property interest status when
Ohio statutorily extended that right to school children.32 On that
basis the court found that "Ohio may not withdraw that right on
grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred." 33
The majority's discussion of the liberty interest was somewhat
limited. The essence of their argument is that an injury to one's
good name, honor and reputation is a deprivation of liberty that
may not occur absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine
whether that deprivation is warranted. 3 4 The students in Goss were
suspended for misconduct. The Court stated that "[i]f sustained
and recorded, those charges could seriously damage the students'
standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as inter' 5
fere with later opportunities for higher education and employment.' 1
The majority bypassed the problems that had confronted the
lower courts regarding lesser suspensions.' 6 In so doing the Court
stated that as long as a deprivation is not de minimis, 7 the gravity of that deprivation is irrelevant.' 8
[I]n determining "whether due process requirements apply
in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to
the nature of the interest at stake." . . . [T]he total exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial
period, and certainly if the suspension is for 10 days, is a
serious event in the life of the suspended child.' 9
Having determined that due process applies to suspension of 10
days or less, the Court turned to what process was due. Because
discipline must be maintained in the nation's schools, the Court
naturally felt hesitant in imposing rigorous 'standards upon a looselysystem of regulation plus civil or criminal sanctions, rather than a system based upon denial, suspnaiOn and revocation." Id. at 785.
31.

E.g.,

Wolff

v.

McDonald,

418

U.S

539

(1974)

(a

prisoner who has accumulated

good-time credits under state law is entitled to procedural protection prior to official cancellation of those credits); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process applies
to governmental decisions to revoke parole) Connel v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971)
(a substitute teacher must have a hearing
failure to sign a loyalty oath); Goldberg v.

or inquiry prior to
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254

summary dismissal for
(1970)
(procedural du.

process protections are afforded welfare recipients who have statutory rights to welfare).
32. OHIo Rav. CoDn ANN. §§ 3313.48-.64 (1972) provides for free education of all
school age youths.
33. 95 S. Ct. at 736.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See cases cited notes 26, 27 and accompanying text saupra.
37.
95 S. Ct. at 737. But see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)
(serious damage); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)
(grievous loss); Bell v
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)
(important interests); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 379 (1971)
(significant property interest); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (grievous loss).

38.
39.

95 S. Ct. at 737.
Id.
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structured system. 40 Therefore, they imposed no more than the
bare minimum-notice and opportunity to be heard. 41 This requires
that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges
against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities
have and an opportunity to present his
42
side of the story.
Imposition of more stringent standards such as presence of counsel
43
and confrontation of witnesses was not required.
Writing for the dissent, Justice Powell disagreed with the ma-jority on three basic issues: 1) the scope of governmentally-created property interests; 2) the de minimis standard; 3) judicial in44
tervention in schools generally.
Although the dissent agreed with the majority that appellee
school children did possess a right of free public education, it disagreed with the extent of that right. Justice Powell argued that

the right of education was not extended to Ohio school children
free of discipline. "The Ohio statute that creates the right to a
'free' education also explicitly authorizes a principal to suspend
a student for up to 10 days. ' 45 Therefore, the very same legislation that established a right to education also defined the dimen4
sions within which that right may be exercised. 1

Secondly, the dissent stated that a de minimis standard has
rarely been used-more often due process protection has been ex40. Id. at 739. The court further stated: "The difficulty Is that our schools are vast
and complex. Some modicum of discipline and order is essential. if the educational function
is to be performed. . . . The prospect of imposing elaborate hearing requirements in every
:,i'spension case is viewed with great concern.
Id.
41. Id. at 738.
42. Id. at 740.
Further clarifying their holding the majority stated:
There need be no delay between the time "notice" is given and the time of
the hearing. . . . [A]s a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal of the student from school. . . . Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the
academic process may be immediately removed from school. In such cases,
the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable ...
43. Id.
44. 95 S. Ct. at 742 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting.)
45. Id. at 742.
46. Id. But see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (Powell, J.,concurring in
part and concurring in the result in part) (dismissed government employee is provided
procedural protection against arbitrary dismissal by 5 U.S.C. § 7501 and accompanying
regulations, rather than the due process clause of the fifth amendment) where Justice
Powell stated:
The plurality opinion evidently reasons that the nature of appellee's interest
in continued federal employment is necessarily defined and limited by the
statutory procedures for discharge and that the constitutional guarantee of
procedural due process accords to appellee no procedural protections against
arbitrary or erroneous discharge other than those expressly provided in the
statute. The plurality would thus conclude that the statute governing federal
employment determines not only the nature of appellee's property interest, but
also the extent of the procedural protections to which he may lay claim. It
seems to me that this approach is incompatible with the principles laid down
in Roth and Sinderrnann. Indeed, it would lead directly to the conclusion that
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47
tended only when individual's suffer "serious" or "grievous" loss.
Lastly and most importantly, Justice Powell views the present
decision as a mandate for increased school intervention. Many similar routine school decisions identical in principle with those in Goss
have now been placed within the court's discretion. "In [his]
view, the constitutionalizing of routine classroom decisions .
represents a significant and unwise extension of the Due Process
,"48
Clause.

The Goss decision represents a coincidence of two transitional
phases within the Court. The first phase began during the initial
stages of the welfare state. The government created a new form
of wealth; 49 therefore, the Court was forced to define the dimensions
of that wealth.5 0 The second phase began in the late sixties when
student rebellion became the norm.51 The Court was again forced
to create limits, this time concerning student rights.
Because of this intersection of phases, the subsequent rationale
used in Goss does not fully explain the outcome. Beliefs regarding
school intervention were intertwined with property interest considerations. Therefore, the 5-4 split of the Court does not represent a
hardened majority or minority.
Due process, although an amorphous concept, cannot be brushed
aside, no matter how controversial the issue or difficult the application. The majority in Goss handles this problem adequately by imposing procedural guarantees while still maintaining the integrity
of the American school system.
FRED STREGE

whatever the nature of an individual's statutorily created property interest,
deprivation

of that interest could be accomplished

without notice or a

hear-

ing at any time. This view misconceives the origin of the right to procedural
due process. That right is
tutional guarantee.

7d. at 166-67.
47. 95 S. Ct. at 743-44 (1975).
48. 95 S. Ct. at 747 (1975).
49. See Reich, supra note 31.
50.

conferred not by legislative grace, but by consti-

See also cases cited note 37 and accompanying textsupra.

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.

5L .See

Wright, supra note 28.

564 (1972).

